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Offshore outsourcing: A dynamic, operation mode perspective  
 
Abstract 
While the extant literature on offshore outsourcing at the firm level basically deals with 
this operation mode in isolation, in this paper we address the issue of outsourcing in the 
context of the broader question of how companies choose and use outsourcing as part of 
their operation mode development in foreign markets. Based on a case study of the 
Danish company SimCorp and the development of its operations in Kiev, Ukraine, we 
analyse offshore outsourcing in a broader, longitudinal foreign operation mode context, 
and how it may contribute to mode change in the host country over a certain span of time. 
The case study approach allowed us to explore the dynamic processes in depth. The study 
shows that involvement in the foreign market generates learning in various forms that 
provide a foundation for eventual mode development or change – beyond outsourcing 
specific learning. At the same time, restrictions on 3rd parties’, that is, independent 
vendors’ access to confidential client data, as well as protection of specific investments in 
human assets, may eventually become a driver for mode change, as in the SimCorp case, 
to ensure more effective control of the foreign operation. Finally, the case study shows 
how outsourcing can be used proactively as a springboard to deeper and changed 
operation mode activities in a foreign market. 
 
Keywords: Outsourcing, offshoring, foreign operation mode dynamics, case study. 
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Offshore outsourcing: A dynamic, operation mode perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Offshore outsourcing – the delegation of specified value chain activities to one or more 
foreign provider(s) – has, for good reasons, received considerable attention from 
international business and management researchers over the last decade.1 Outsourcing 
was the focus of a recent special issue of Industrial Marketing Management in which its 
impact on business-to-business marketing was examined. In the introduction to the 
special issue Ahearne and Kothandaraman (2009, 376) maintain: ‘Increasing 
globalization has made companies focus more on their outsourcing decisions. Moving 
beyond the tactical companies have begun to incorporate outsourcing as a strategic 
weapon in their armory’. Recently, attention has been drawn to the growing importance 
of offshore outsourcing in the services sector (Bunyaratavej et al., 2008; Griffith et al., 
2009). Given the size of the services sector in advanced economies, this latter trend is of 
particular significance (UNCTAD, 2004). The ability to utilize offshore outsourcing has 
been facilitated by the development of large multinational companies providing 
outsourced production and other services on a global scale (Welch, Benito and Petersen, 
2007). Intermediaries like the Hong Kong-based company Li and Fung have emerged as 
specialists in handling the various steps in offshore outsourcing for their client firms – 
allowing companies effectively to outsource the outsourcing problem (Economist 2001; 
Einhorn 2009; Welch, Benito and Petersen, 2007). In this article we focus on services and 
take the treatment of outsourcing, in offshore form, down a different strategic path by 
asking the questions: what follows, and what should follow, after offshore outsourcing? 
Most of the research on offshore outsourcing examines the phenomenon at a 
certain point in time (see e.g. Bunyaratavej, Hahn and Doh, 2007), whereas fewer studies 
apply a dynamic perspective (for an exception, see Lewin, Massini and Peeters, 2009). 
As examples of dynamic issues, Dossani and Kenney (2004) and Manning, Massini and 
                                                 
1 This has been reflected in recent special issues on offshore outsourcing (as well as captive offshoring) in 
International Business Review (2011), Journal of International Business Studies (2009), Journal of 
International Management (2007) and  Journal of Management Studies (2005). 
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Lewin (2008) point to evidence of a change in outsourcing motives from basically being 
cost-focused towards a broader palette of strategic drivers. From substantial survey work, 
involving a full size range of European and US companies, Manning, Massini and Lewin 
(2008, 35) argue, that “reducing labor costs is no longer the only strategic driver behind 
offshoring decisions. Accessing pools of highly skilled talent around the world […] has 
emerged as a new key strategic driver”.  
Further, Maskell et al. (2004) find evidence of offshore outsourcing as a gradually 
expanding process in which companies initially outsource limited tasks, but – as 
outsourcing experience is accumulated – broaden the range of business functions being 
outsourced to foreign providers. Outsourcing of manufacturing and IT tasks seems to lead 
to the addition of other value added activities to be outsourced, such as human resource 
management, finance and accounting, and research and development. Put together, these 
dynamic perspectives suggest that offshore outsourcing is a phenomenon that fits with 
conventional internationalization process theory in which firms’ foreign engagements 
evolve as an incremental learning process (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977/2006; Johanson 
and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Welch and Luostarinen, 1988); though with the important 
caveat that firms’ offshore outsourcing location decisions may be less susceptible to a 
psychic distance logic (Hatönen and Eriksson, 2009) to the extent that the outsourcing 
location first of all is determined by countries’ factor endowment and not local demand. 
However, physical and cultural distance cannot be dismissed as location decision factors 
when outsourcing operations imply learning and close interaction between the contractee 
and the outsourcing firm and/or its clients. Stringfellow et al. (2008) stress that 
interaction intensity and interaction distance (including language distance) have an 
impact on the extent of invisible costs in offshoring service work, and therefore its 
viability.  
Although both static and dynamic studies have informed us about the offshore 
outsourcing phenomenon of the 1990s and 2000s, there is relatively little known about 
how this foreign operation mode intertwines with a firm’s other modes of operation in the 
host country, and whether and how it might be used to develop foreign operation modes 
in the host market, or other markets including the home market, as part of firm 
internationalization. The extant literature on offshore outsourcing at the firm level 
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basically deals with this operation mode in isolation, addressing questions like: what are 
the motives for offshore outsourcing and what are its managerial and operational 
challenges?  
Therefore, in this paper we address the issue of outsourcing as part of the broader 
question of how companies choose and use outsourcing in foreign operation mode 
development in foreign markets. To our knowledge this is the first attempt to do so. We 
analyse offshore outsourcing in a broader, longitudinal foreign operation mode context 
(Benito, Petersen and Welch, 2009). Our unit of analysis is not just the offshore 
outsourcing operation, but includes the type of changes associated with its use that lead to 
operation mode alteration in the host country over a certain span of time, including within 
mode change. Given the lack of previous research on these issues, our study is 
exploratory, both conceptually and empirically. The focus on a single case, the Danish 
company SimCorp’s development of operations in Kiev, allowed us to explore the 
dynamic processes in depth.  
Our article is organized as follows: we begin with a brief discussion of 
terminology and note the broadening of strategic roles for outsourcing in companies’ 
international operations. We then set offshore outsourcing within the context of firm 
internationalization – both as an initial foreign market activity, and as a subsequent step.  
SimCorp’s evolving operations in Kiev are described and analysed. We conclude with 
case findings and analysis, including the development of a conceptual framework, and 
outline managerial and research implications.   
The key contribution of our analysis is to show the way in which offshore 
outsourcing may contribute to foreign operation mode development and extend the range 
of organizational learning that may be an outcome of outsourcing. In doing so, we change 
the focus away from cost reduction. Empirically, we contribute by providing an in-depth 
case investigation of outsourcing in the services area: bringing a unique insight into the 
process (from initial outsourcing idea to eventual subsidiary establishment) and the 
evolutionary factors that over time underpinned eventual mode change, considered from 
the perspectives of both contractees, the contractor (HQ and project management staff in 
Kiev), and the external consultant.  
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2. Definition 
 
Various definitions and terms have been applied to the outsourcing activity in the 
research literature on the topic (Welch, Benito and Petersen, 2007; Hatönen and Eriksson, 
2009). Indeed, outsourcing as a term has only come into vogue in recent times, even 
though the phenomenon itself is much older (Hatönen and Eriksson, 2009). However, 
terminology and definitional consistency seems to be emerging around what has been 
proposed by UNCTAD (2004). In simple terms, offshoring refers to the relocation of one 
or more processes or functions to a different (and usually lower cost) foreign location 
(Deloitte Consulting, 2008). This relocation can be carried out either in-house, as a tied 
or captive form of operations via the firm’s own subsidiary, or through the use of an 
external supplier in the foreign market (what we refer to as outsourcing). Thus, in this 
article, we concentrate on the final category: offshore or international outsourcing (or 
outsourced offshoring). Kedia and Lahiri (2007, 23) refer to it as ‘independent third-party 
offshore outsourcing’. Effectively, through outsourcing, a company is able to tap into 
another company’s facilities and/or service provision capacities in a foreign location. 
 
3. Changing focus in offshore outsourcing: from cost to competence   
 
Much of the extant literature on offshore outsourcing traces its development and explains 
its rise, although recently going beyond explanations that concentrate on relevant cost 
differences between countries. For example, one study concluded that ‘a country is more 
likely to be a destination of services offshoring as the average wage of a country 
increases’ (Bunyaratavej, Hahn and Doh, 2007, 7). ORN (Offshoring Research Network) 
survey results also indicate that companies are thinking about outsourcing at a more 
general strategic level: ‘more and more companies are formulating and disseminating 
corporate-wide strategies for guiding outsourcing and offshoring decisions …and are 
integrating offshoring decisions into the overall corporate strategy’ (Manning, Massini 
and Lewin, 2008, 49). While governments in general have exhibited concern about, even 
attempting to restrain, the extent of outsourcing because of concerns about domestic job 
losses, at the same time there has been recognition of the need to use outsourcing as a 
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means of accessing the global pool of skilled talent in areas of domestic shortage – even 
by governments. In the case of the Danish company SimCorp (see below), the move to 
outsource part of their software development, while instigated internally, was facilitated 
by a government program called ‘Mind Match’ which actively promoted outsourcing 
possibilities for Danish firms. The company was invited to take part in Danish 
government organised seminars and to meet with potential partners in Saint Petersburg in 
2002 as part of its investigation of outsourcing options. 
From a company perspective, the appeal of outsourcing’s potential to reduce costs 
is understandable – as is the more recent interest in outsourcing’s capacity to relieve 
shortages of high level manpower (Manning, Massini and Lewin, 2008). The popularity 
of outsourcing solutions to such concerns, for example in the area of business process 
outsourcing (Kshetri 2007), has nevertheless led other researchers to raise questions 
about the possible impact on a company’s basic competitive core competence. However, 
the role of outsourcing as a legitimate means of entering and servicing different markets 
in the longer term, as an alternative or complement to foreign direct investment, alliance 
arrangements, licensing and the like, and its role in operation mode development, has 
received far less attention (Welch, Benito and Petersen, 2007). Similarly, Johanson and 
Vahlne (2009, 1427) have commented that the ‘dynamics of the internationalization of 
supply networks is an increasing problem in international business’, but one which has 
received little treatment. 
 
4. Outsourcing and internationalization 
 
As a result, we focus on the way companies can use outsourcing to service foreign 
markets, on entry and beyond, and, through this, its impact on companies’ 
internationalization. While going beyond the argument about cost reduction, we 
recognise that cost reduction may have some important flow-on implications for 
international expansion capacity and strategic options – for example through its impact 
on a company’s international competitiveness(see eg Di Gregorio, Musteen and Thomas, 
2009). Further, for many companies using outsourcing there is no interest in going 
beyond basic contractual arrangements. For example, large US retailers such as Toys ‘R’ 
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Us and Liz Claiborne, are not using outsourcing as a path to other forms of international 
operations (Einhorn 2009). There are many cases of foreign outsourcing of 
manufacturing or servicing where the outsourcer merely plugs the product or service back 
into one minor part of its overall domestic value chain and will never have the scope or 
interest to develop the operation as an end in itself – it has an insignificant place in 
overall operations. In such circumstances, it would be highly unlikely for offshore 
outsourcing to be used or even considered as a springboard to expanded international 
operations.  
In much of the literature, offshore outsourcing tends to be treated as an act, rather 
than as part of an ongoing, evolving process. An exception is Manning, Massini and 
Lewin (2008, 49), who stress the way in which offshoring, including outsourcing, is 
evolving in response to the development of relevant outsourcing capabilities within 
companies; being exposed to various related challenges; and finding ‘new opportunities, 
such as the rise of new locations in the offshoring space and the emergence of new 
specialized external service providers’ (see also Kotabe, Mol and Ketkar, 2008). 
Similarly we emphasise the dynamics of offshore outsourcing: co-evolving with a 
company’s internationalization strategy, both influencing and being influenced by this 
strategy; and as part of a company’s set of evolving operation modes in different foreign 
markets. It should be noted that offshore outsourcing may not be operating as a sole 
mode, and as a separate activity, in a given foreign market, but may be in joint operation 
with other activities and modes – that is, as part of an integrated mode package (Benito, 
Petersen and Welch, 2009). For example, outsourcing could be tied to a licensing 
arrangement with the foreign contractee.  
 
4.1 Offshore outsourcing as the first international step 
For many companies the start of internationalization often occurs on the inward side, for 
example via licensing from a foreign provider (Welch and Luostarinen, 1993; Holmlund, 
Kock and Vanyushyn, 2007). A study of Finnish SMEs found that more than half of the 
surveyed companies began international activities as inward operations (Korhonen, 
Luostarinen and Welch, 1996). The global rise of offshore outsourcing has included 
many cases where it represents the starting point of international operations for the 
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companies concerned, often with an inward focus, such as importing back into the 
outsourcer’s home market.  
Despite its role as a common starting point in international operations, there has 
been surprisingly little research on offshore outsourcing as a mode of international entry, 
and of the longer-term international consequences of this establishment role. As a 
triggering factor in a company’s international start, offshore outsourcing may have 
implications for later internationalization that go well beyond the act itself. The emerging 
research on inward-outward connections in internationalization is suggestive of the 
different ways in which offshore outsourcing might contribute to expanded forms of 
foreign operations (Karlsen, Silseth, Benito and Welch, 2003). It might involve 
contributions such as: basic international exposure to potential clients, on both inward 
and outward sides; network development in the foreign market; learning about, and 
developing skills in, various aspects of international operations that are transferable to 
other forms of international operations; and cross-cultural exposure. It is conceivable that 
a company starts with offshore outsourcing as an inward-oriented activity, but adds 
outward-oriented operations from its international outsourced base in the foreign market 
– servicing the contractee’s market or third markets. However, research on inward-
outward connections indicates that the connections may not be straightforward, often 
involving varied, indirect and opaque links over time (Welch and Luostarinen, 1993).    
 
4.2 Offshore outsourcing as a later step 
Contractual arrangements in various forms are often used as stepping stones to alternative 
mode arrangements in companies’ international expansion processes (Welch, Benito and 
Petersen, 2007). Contractual arrangements can even include clauses which facilitate later 
takeover (Petersen, Welch and Welch, 2000). In some cases, offshore outsourcing may 
perform its most important role as a foundation for penetration of a given foreign market, 
rather than as a source of any short term cost advantages. For companies that are engaged 
in varied mode use in different parts of the value chain in a given foreign market, it may 
be relatively straightforward to move into, or out of, outsourcing with regard to one part 
of the value chain, especially if outsourcing experience and knowledge have already been 
acquired in other markets (Mudambi, 2008; Welch, Benito, and Petersen, 2007). Grote 
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and Täube (2007), focusing on financial research activities, concluded that ability to do 
so depended on the strength of ties to other parts and processes within a company.   
Offshore outsourcing may be introduced into international operations at any stage 
in a company’s foreign expansion beyond its starting point: the longer, deeper and more 
expansive a company’s international involvement the more substantial the international 
experience base which a company can work from in establishing the outsourcing activity. 
There might be some cases where there is little value from past experience (as our case 
company SimCorp found; see also Karlsen et al. 2003), but others where the base is so 
long standing and substantial as to make for a relatively easy path into the new operation 
mode. The outsourcing could be fitted closely with preceding operations in a given 
foreign market, as part of a comprehensive mode package (Benito, Petersen and Welch, 
2009) or the connections may range to the point of almost full independence or 
disconnection, thereby ensuring limited support from the pre-existing operation. For 
example, divisions of the Norwegian multinational Norsk Hydro developed operations in 
India independently of each other – with limited utilisation of the others’ experiences 
(Tomassen, Welch and Benito, 1998). We now turn to the study of the Danish company 
SimCorp and its adoption of foreign outsourcing as a means of supporting its core 
software development activities.   
 
5. The SimCorp case: Methodology 
 
5.1. Research design and data collection 
Given the paucity of prior research, we considered an exploratory study as the 
appropriate initial step in investigating the phenomenon of offshore outsourcing in a 
dynamic mode development perspective. Eisenhardt (1989, 548, 9) has argued that case 
study research is especially ‘appropriate in the early stages of research on a topic…or 
research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate’ (see also Patton, 1990). Case 
study approaches are also particularly useful when trying to follow longitudinal patterns 
and processes of some complexity (Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 1990), as in this study, in 
which we followed the outsourcing development over a number of years from its 
inception in SimCorp HQ in Copenhagen (2002) to ultimate subsidiary establishment in 
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Kiev (2007) and beyond. Case study research has long been regarded as a suitable 
research approach when the focus of research is on “how” and “why” questions (Yin, 
2003; Ghauri, 2004), and these were critical questions for our study as we sought to 
understand how SimCorp came to be involved in and went about outsourcing, the driving 
forces behind this move, and the process that led it to eventually replace its independent 
suppliers with its own subsidiary. 
The case company was chosen because of the in-depth access to those involved in 
the outsourcing decision-making in SimCorp and at the Ukrainian contractees – that is, 
purposeful sampling was undertaken. Patton (1990, 169) has argued that ‘the logic and 
power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth’ 
(see also Eisenhardt, 1989 and Yin, 2003). A strength of the study was the access to key 
players in the outsourcing venture. The triangulation of informants was an important way 
of validating the case study data (Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki and Welch, 2010; Yin 2003). 
Those interviewed were:  
 the head of the software development unit at SimCorp headquarters (until 2008); 
 the outsourcing project manager (2005-2007) who re-located to Kiev after 
initially managing the project from Copenhagen; 
 the managing directors of the two Ukrainian contractees Infopulse and ProFIX; 
 four employees of SimCorp Ukraine who worked at the contractees on SimCorp 
projects and later shifted to SimCorp’s subsidiary operation; 
 the representative of the consulting firm who was involved in the original 
decision-making process that led to the selection of Ukraine and the contractees.  
 
Interviews were conducted over a three month period in 2009 by one of the 
authors. Each interview lasted about an hour, and was recorded and transcribed. 
Interviews were conducted in the local language (Danish and Ukrainian), then translated 
into English by one of the authors. Prior to the interviews each informant was sent a list 
of guideline questions and themes to be covered in the interview. In addition, 
documentary secondary data were provided by SimCorp – including administrative 
records, internal memos and reports and contractual agreements. 
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In methodological terms the company and the situation surrounding the use of 
outsourcing and the eventual move to subsidiary establishment can be seen as 
representing a “critical” case dealing with the phenomenon under investigation – the role 
of outsourcing in foreign operation development (Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 1990).12 The 
benefit of such a single case investigation was the opportunity to delve more deeply into 
processual aspects of SimCorp’s Ukrainian venture. Single cases trade such an in-depth 
approach for the comparative insights of a multiple case study (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991). 
A study of the use of cases in Industrial Marketing Management between 1997 and 2006 
found that almost half were single case investigations (Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki and 
Welch, 2010). The authors note that for processual investigations, in-depth case studies 
are particularly useful in exposing dynamic influences (see also Piekkari, Welch and 
Paavilainen, 2009). Single cases are also useful for in-depth, exploratory investigations 
with the aim of theoretical extension (Ghauri, 2004).  
 
5.2 The company 
SimCorp is a Danish company, specialising in financial services software. Its revenue in 
2010 was EUR 185.4 million. In 2010 it had nineteen foreign subsidiaries and branches, 
including the one in Ukraine. In 2001, when the company first began to exploring 
outsourcing as an option it already had established subsidiaries in nine countries. 
Revenue is derived from three main forms: sales of software licences, maintenance 
income and fees from professional services. SimCorp’s main product – SimCorp 
Dimension – is a comprehensive system solution for professional investment managers 
that supports all the elements of the investment management process. It accounted for 
approximately 95% of the Group’s business.  Table 1 below summarises the evolution in 
                                                 
2 We also took an abductive inferential approach to the use of this case (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007; 
Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Van Maanen, Sørensen and Mitchell, 2007). Dubois and Gadde (2002, p. 554) 
use the term “systematic combining”, wherein “research issues and the analytical framework are 
successively reoriented when they are confronted with the empirical world”, as an example of so-called 
“abductive” logic in research. For example, the empirical investigation led to a stronger focus on the nature 
of the learning processes taking place through outsourcing activities, bearing in mind that, for the company 
under investigation, this was a step into the unknown at two levels: the type of market (former Communist 
state) and the mode (offshore outsourcing). 
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SimCorp’s operations in the Ukraine: from offshore outsourcing to the establishment of 
its own subsidiary, although the initial idea occurred far earlier.  
 
 
Table 1: Key Phases in the Development of SimCorp’s Ukrainian Operation 
 
Phases / 
Duration 
Context of the Relationship Contracts and Provisions Use of Options 
Pilot project: 
Offshore 
outsourcing 
March - August 
2005 
Probation period 
To test the parties’ 
compatibility on a small scale 
project 
Memorandum of 
Understanding 
Pilot project terms and 
conditions.  
Draft version of the contract 
Inherent options:  
Option to abandon the 
project if deemed un-
successful (not exercised);  
Option to expand the project if 
deemed successful 
(exercised) 
Full 
cooperation: 
Offshore 
outsourcing 
August 2005 – 
September 2007 
 
Outsourcing cooperation 
Service providers acting as 
subcontractors. Search for 
and selection of qualified 
personnel. Idiosyncratic 
Investments by SimCorp – 
training and education. 
Increasing asset specificity 
Cooperation Agreement 
Legal framework for 
outsourcing cooperation.  
Terms and conditions of 
each party’s responsibilities. 
Option for future cooperation 
– JV option. 
 
JV option in the contract: 
SimCorp 51% of shares; 
appoint managing director 
and chairman of the board 
(the option was not not 
exercised).  
Implicit options: staff 
motivation, retention and 
integration into SimCorp 
(partly exercised) 
Wholly owned 
subsidiary 
establishment; 
operations and 
staff transfer 
Autumn 2007 – 
May 2009 
(including future 
HR cooperation) 
Integration of human 
resources. 
Taking over the service 
providers’ personnel on a 
legal basis after 
establishment of own 
subsidiary.  
Option of further transfers 
after reaching 18 month 
experience threshold. 
Addendum to Cooperation 
Agreement 
Extension of the contract to 
operationalise staff transfer. 
Option of future cooperation 
– future HR services. 
Future cooperation option 
Option to transfer, on a 
selective basis, project staff 
members to own subsidiary 
(exercised). 
 
Option to use the service 
providers’ assistance in 
search for, and selection of, 
new staff candidates (partly 
exercised). 
 
  
14 
 
6. The outsourcing decision and implementation 
 
6.1 Initial considerations 
During winter 2001/2002, SimCorp’s management for the first time considered the idea 
of outsourcing. It was initiated in the software development department (IMS 
Development) primarily because the market for good IT software developers and 
engineers had become tighter in Denmark. Consequently, it seemed reasonable to 
consider moving the future growth of development capacity to a place with lower costs. 
The cost factor was quite important as, at that time, SimCorp was struggling to match 
revenues and rapidly growing expenses. SimCorp’s senior management team decided to 
investigate the general prospects of offshore outsourcing, and to establish a profile of an 
appropriate offshore outsourcing partner in the near geographical area. It was decided 
that a potential partner should be located within 2-3 hours flight distance from 
Copenhagen in order to be able to maintain close contact without being constrained by 
the long travelling hours.  
In 2002 Russia was investigated. However, suitable candidates were not found in 
terms of data security, available infrastructure, educational level, managerial 
competencies, price level, and communication capacity (eg English skills). Furthermore, 
the company’s management realised that SimCorp was not ready to deal with all the 
challenges of an offshore outsourcing venture. As a result, SimCorp turned its attention 
back to the domestic market, looking for possible qualified partners among Danish firms 
in order to try out outsourcing possibilities without the perceived major challenges and 
risks stemming from offshore outsourcing. This did not work out either, as SimCorp was 
again unable to find suitable partners 
Thus, after some consideration, SimCorp’s senior management team (SMT) 
decided to postpone the decision about any form of outsourcing. An internal evaluation at 
that point in time showed the company was not fully ready to carry out an outsourcing 
project. However, during the period up to autumn 2004 it became even harder to find 
qualified IT programmers in Denmark, which brought the outsourcing discussion back on 
the table. SimCorp’s management decided to start a new investigation of offshore 
outsourcing opportunities. For this purpose, it hired a consultancy firm, Developmate, 
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which specialised in IT offshore outsourcing, to conduct a thorough examination of 
outsourcing possibilities in cooperation with SimCorp management. After initial 
screening and a thorough country investigation by Developmate, SimCorp’s management 
decided to proceed with Ukraine, which resulted in further screening of the market for 
potential suitable partners3. Following the partner screening process, the representatives 
from SimCorp’s senior management group and IMS Development department paid a 
number of visits to three Ukrainian companies of interest in February 2005. In the 
decision process, SimCorp always wanted to have more than one cooperation partner in 
the same area. This was considered crucial in order to be able to balance and compare 
service providers against each other in terms of price and quality of work, as well as 
stimulate a continuous positive rivalry among the partners. Another aspect equally 
important for SimCorp in this regard was to diversify the risk of becoming too dependent 
on one particular partner.  
 
6.2 The pilot project 
The selection process led to the choice of two companies, Infopulse and ProFIX. 
SimCorp started carrying through pilot projects with them on a probationary basis. The 
parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which outlined the terms and 
conditions of the projects and probation period. The MoU outlined also the initial 
framework for future potential cooperation between SimCorp and the Ukrainian service 
providers. This included three phases: 1) the pilot project phase; if successful this would 
lead to 2) a long-term cooperation phase; potentially followed by 3) the exercise of a joint 
venture option with the service provider. The pilot project set-up had the following 
conditions: A duration period of approximately three months; involvement of 4-5 full-
time software engineers who would receive extensive training at SimCorp premises in 
Copenhagen. Upon completion of the pilot project, results would be evaluated by 
SimCorp’s senior management and benchmarked against the standards of newly 
employed Danish candidates as well as against other external consultants used by 
SimCorp. SimCorp additionally secured the intellectual property rights on all material 
                                                 
3 In SimCorp terminology, the word “partner” was very often used when referring to service 
providers/vendors. 
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conceived, discovered or produced in connection with the pilot project. If the 
arrangement did not work out, each party was to cover their own part of the costs and 
cease cooperation.  
 
6.3 Long-term cooperation 
After both pilot projects produced satisfactory results, during the autumn of 2005 
SimCorp and both service providers had a number of negotiations over entering the next 
phase of long-term cooperation - in essence continuing the outsourcing cooperation 
between SimCorp and Infopulse and ProFIX. The partner firms were to provide the 
services of searching, selecting and recruiting new, qualified candidates for the SimCorp 
development teams, and to provide the physical environment, technical support and 
infrastructure. As successful completion of the pilot project was a precondition for further 
cooperation, a number of terms and conditions were not finalised in the initial MoU, 
which required further negotiations after completion of the pilot project phase. The legal 
contract signed between the parties was an extended version of the original MoU. The 
Cooperation Agreement outlined the important conditions for long-term outsourcing 
cooperation and the rights and responsibilities of each party. Accordingly, the service 
providers were obliged to commit named and specified resources to the SimCorp 
development team based on SimCorp’s specifications. In its turn, SimCorp was 
responsible for providing the necessary training and education of the vendors’ personnel. 
In November 2005 SimCorp expatriated its outsourcing project manager to Kiev 
in order to better coordinate and control the offshore development. It had become more 
and more difficult to manage the operation from Copenhagen. A person was needed in 
Kiev who could ensure SimCorp control, help Ukrainian project staff understand “the 
SimCorp way” of doing things, and ensure good communication flow between Kiev and 
Copenhagen. Two more employees from SimCorp Denmark were expatriated to Kiev 
during 2006. SimCorp had attempted to head off potential control problems through the 
terms of its partner (contractee) contracts. For example, the service providers were 
obliged to commit named and specified resources to the SimCorp development team 
based on SimCorp’s specifications. However, SimCorp was not able to anticipate the full 
gamut of issues that emerged, and some were not directly controllable because it was 
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dealing with independent entities. Establishment of its training facility (SimCorp 
Academy) in Kiev in 2006 allowed the company to achieve a measure of control over the 
training and development of local staff.  
 
6.4 Subsidiary establishment 
SimCorp established a wholly-owned subsidiary in Ukraine in 2007. After deciding to do 
so, it negotiated an agreement that would allow the company to “acquire” the service 
providers’ personnel and transfer them to the newly established entity. As SimCorp did 
not have a clause in the Cooperation Agreement that would specify the terms for 
establishment of a wholly-owned subsidiary and transfer of resources, an addendum to 
the original cooperation contract was negotiated and put in place. Further a clause was 
inserted in the addendum to cover future HR cooperation – specifically concerning help 
in finding suitable staff.  
 
 
7. Case analysis and findings 
 
7.1 Sequential internationalization 
In one sense SimCorp’s foray into Ukraine via offshore outsourcing proceeded like a 
classical case of sequential internationalization, despite its preceding range of 
international experience (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Welch and Luostarinen, 1988). 
The company was unsure about what it should do, even whether the step was appropriate 
or not, with considerable internal debate. Uncertainty was strongly felt by management. 
This was illustrated by the decision in 2002 to go back to the Danish market to seek local 
contractees rather than pursue the offshore path once difficulties were exposed. It only re-
launched its offshore search when it became evident that a Danish solution would not be 
forthcoming. Thus, the process of adopting offshore outsourcing, the country of choice 
and the choice of eventual contractees was marked by a high level of caution and 
concern, and of attempts to limit the extent of commitment. Having decided on Ukraine, 
with external consulting help, it started with two pilot outsourcing arrangements – 
thereby limiting its commitment, taking an experimental approach to its initial 
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involvement, enabling withdrawal with limited costs if the outcome was deemed 
unsatisfactory. This is despite the fact that the company already had considerable 
experience in the international arena, although not in outsourcing. It clearly viewed much 
of its knowledge base as not being readily adaptable to its Ukrainian venture. 
Nevertheless, it had built up sufficient internal commitment to the new strategy such that 
it was prepared to declare a serious long term interest in the initial agreement with the 
Ukrainian contractees – including the possibility of a change to a JV. Such internal 
commitment development can be as important as the market commitment which is the 
primary focus of internationalization models. From the outset, there was a recognition 
that if relations and performance evolved as hoped, the initial outsourcing operation 
might develop into something more substantial: outsourcing was not necessarily the 
finishing point. The head of SimCorp’s software development unit referred to the 
company’s strategy in Ukraine in terms of “building up the development capacity 
offshore at low cost”. 
Despite the flagging of potential future mode development, how the outsourcing 
operation unfolded was crucial to further commitment, and in the end the path chosen, 
was not as originally anticipated. In this respect, it was evident that a range of evolving, 
interacting factors, such as those illustrated in Figure 1 below (including a reduction in 
perceived risk and uncertainty of the venture), explain the eventual switch to a 
subsidiary-based outsourcing operation. The nature and extent of direct involvement in a 
foreign market by the outsourcer inevitably affects the likelihood and form of any future 
commitments. Exploitable, new market opportunities beyond the confines of the initial 
contractual relationship may emerge, within the foreign market and/or beyond (Hatönen 
and Eriksson, 2009). Activities could be as basic as visits by the outsourcer’s staff to 
liaise with the contractee, but could go further and involve market research, market 
scanning, and contact with different market players. In SimCorp’s case, although heavily 
involved in the Ukrainian operation, this was relatively narrowly confined so that, for 
example, learning benefits centred around outsourcing and related activities, rather than 
being market related.  
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7.2 Learning 
A key factor in mode change was learning. The learning that occurs through offshoring, 
enhancing the knowledge and capabilities of offshoring companies, for example through 
various interactions within the foreign market, has been stressed by Kenney, Massini and 
Murtha (2009; see also Johanson and Vahlne, 1977 and 2006 for a consideration of more 
general effects of learning on internationalization). Because SimCorp lacked previous 
experience in outsourcing, in Ukraine and with the partners (contractees) chosen, the 
unfolding learning process was critical to subsequent mode development. The pilot 
project was critical: it was viewed by SimCorp management as a way of allowing 
experimentation without long-term commitment. It provided a platform for learning 
about the practicalities and demands of outsourcing, as well as the potential for a more 
substantial, long-term commitment. One key aspect was for SimCorp to be assured that it 
could effectively teach Ukrainian staff to work with SimCorp’s software development 
platform. The project manager commented: “It is a quite special system and a 
programming language [APL] that is not so well-known, which needed to be learnt first”. 
There were unintended learning benefits from the first project (with Infopulse) to the 
second (with ProFix) because of a delay in starting the latter. Feedback from running the 
first project ensured that SimCorp was more prepared to start the second project, as well 
as equipping the company with a concrete assessment tool that had already been proven 
to work. A high level of interaction between the parties, and movement between 
Copenhagen and Kiev, as cooperation developed over time facilitated the learning 
process on both sides, and in both locations. 
 
7.3 Partner relationships, trust and mutual adaptation 
Communication between the parties intensified as the operation moved beyond the initial 
pilot project activities. To some extent this was a by-product of the type of activity being 
outsourced – software development – which ensured that there had to be a high level of 
personal interaction between HQ development teams and those in Kiev. In addition, HQ 
management was actively involved in managing activities and relationships in Kiev. 
Initially this was accomplished through travelling staff, then through expatriate 
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appointments. SimCorp consciously sought to drive this process of interaction through 
different integrative steps, structural and social, with the aim of fostering communication. 
Development staff in Ukraine was divided into groups according to the organization 
structure in SimCorp and had direct communication with their respective teams in 
Copenhagen. Thus, despite being an outsourcing project, close day-to-day interaction and 
involvement between the offshore operation and SimCorp developed.  
The strength of relational development with its two Ukrainian partners was 
critical in enabling SimCorp to enact so many of its policies including some that were not 
covered under the terms of the Cooperation Agreement. However, the positive 
communication and staff interaction that took place did not occur in a vacuum: they 
evolved and depended on a supportive relational context between the parties. Over time, 
this became characterised by trust, to an extent that it was a facilitator of the move to a 
fully-owned subsidiary and supported a continuation of cooperation between the parties 
in the area of staffing even after the subsidiary was established and many of the activities 
internalized. There was a process of mutual adaptation between the parties as relations 
developed. This was most evident in the key area of training and staff deployment – in 
Kiev and Copenhagen. Cooperation between the SimCorp development teams in Kiev 
and IMS Development in Denmark increased gradually as training of the people in Kiev 
progressed and they started to become more competent and specialised in working for 
SimCorp. Such adaptations increase commitment on both sides and can become part of a 
base for extended collaboration (Madhok, 1995).  
Language was a further aspect of adaptation. Ukrainian staff in general did not 
speak English fluently, but SimCorp required English proficiency for every member of 
the development teams. This was somewhat atypical for ProFIX, which used to work 
with projects where only a couple of people were required to speak the language and they 
served as a communication channel for the rest of the group. Nevertheless, because 
SimCorp was offering interesting and challenging work, people were motivated to invest 
time to improve their English proficiency. Infopulse management offered English courses 
at the company’s expense for upgrading language skills if SimCorp found technically 
appropriate candidates among Infopulse staff who lacked English communication skills.  
 
21 
 
7.4 Staff retention and confidentiality requirements 
Staff retention and confidentiality requirements stand out as the dynamic influences that 
emerged most strongly from the case data. Given the service business that SimCorp was 
involved in, people were key, and they could leave at any time, so the need to control the 
HR levers was recognised very early. The move to a subsidiary operation was almost an 
inevitable end point once this was clearly recognized and commitment to the Ukrainian 
operation firmly established within the company. The SimCorp project manager stressed 
the challenge of retention: “One of our biggest problems in cooperation with partners 
was the fact that we did not have control over the employee salary. The partners did. And 
it was sometimes difficult, as there were cases, where we would like to retain [people] 
also on higher salary, but because partners did not want to give the salary increase, we 
would lose those people, and it was too bad”. Similarly, the head of the SimCorp 
development unit related: “the whole establishment of own subsidiary … would give us 
opportunities to make certain things (happen), which we could not do because we worked 
with partners i.e. differentiate people’s salary, retain and motivate people”. 
Even more important for the decision to move to a captive operation were the 
restrictions on using 3rd party development resources for client support. As a result of 
their surprisingly quick upgrading the time arrived when it would be natural to let the 
teams of the two partner firms collaborate directly with SimCorp’s clients around 
customizing their software. However, given the confidentiality of the information held by 
the clients only SimCorp’s own developers were allowed access to the client systems. 
SimCorp’s head of the software development unit expressed the pressing need for 
employing the Ukrainian system developers in the following way: “We could not take 
Ukrainian people and send them to work on projects in Scandinavia, England or other 
places, as they were not directly employed by SimCorp. This is prohibited according to 
the contracts we have with our clients. So, we wanted to open up for this possibility [...] 
to be able to have a resource pool in Ukraine, whose people could be sent for 3-6 months 
projects to different places. This would be possible without any problems, if they would 
be employed by SimCorp.”  
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7.5 Mode change 
The various dynamic, interactive factors examined above are illustrated in Fig 1.  
Offshore outsourcing
Changed foreign operation mode setup: 
with/without outsourcing
Dynamic
mechanisms
contributing 
to mode 
development
servicing host 
market
servicing 
other markets
interaction
learning –
eg foreign
market/s,
operations
networks,
relations, 
trust
mutual 
adaptation
Staff 
retention /  
client con-
fidentiality
perceived 
uncertainty
and risk
            
Figure 1:  Offshore outsourcing as a springboard 
 
Their combined, evolving influence was important in moving the company to a 
stage where mode change was almost a natural next step. Substantial within mode change 
(Benito, Petersen and Welch, 2009) acted as a lead into, and stimulus for, eventual mode 
change. This took various forms: through various HR activities, including personnel 
visits, both ways; expatriation of HQ staff members to Kiev; training; and language 
policies, all of which had the effect of gradually integrating the Ukrainian operations into 
SimCorp, even though the services were notionally provided by independent Ukrainian 
companies.  
The evolution of trust was critical to the process. There is evidence that even with 
shorter term single contract arrangements, outsourcers prefer to develop these deals with 
trusted suppliers, that is, within the context of longer term relationships (Kakabadse and 
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Kakabadse, 2005). The process of establishing a contractual relationship and of enacting 
the relationship may open up different possibilities for further forms of cooperation that 
lead to mode change. These might include, for example, joint activities with the 
contractee’s staff or training and technological exchanges as in the SimCorp case. Such 
collaborative activities allow for the evolution of knowledge and understanding between 
the two parties, of adaptations to each other, and the development of trust (Young and 
Wilkinson, 1989). Kedia and Lahiri (2007) point to the contribution of trustworthiness to 
the development of long term cooperation in outsourcing relationships. As Gainey and 
Klaas (2003, 209) stress, ‘while an outsourcing arrangement may begin as an arm’s-
length relationship, disciplined only through market-based mechanisms, over time it may 
be transformed through a social exchange process’. In their study, they found a positive 
connection between trust and outsourcer satisfaction with outsourcing, while trust was 
positively related with relationship tenure and communication behaviour. In the case of 
Simcorp and its Ukrainian partners, although they began with a long term perspective, the 
development of trust was critical to subsequent commitments.  
The development of trust between parties encourages disclosure and sharing of 
knowledge, particularly when it involves access to and use of personal networks, thus 
supporting the learning process (McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer, 2003; Michailova and 
Husted, 2003; Welch and Welch, 2008). This contributes to the development of social 
capital. Thus, as a positive relationship between the outsourcer and foreign contractee 
develops, embedded within growing social capital, it provides a foundation that supports 
any consideration of extension of the core outsourcing operation into other arrangements, 
including more formal types of integration. Ultimately, from this process there might be a 
substantial foundation for a move to a stronger link. Relationships may develop to such 
an extent that quasi-integration takes place, facilitating formal internalization steps by the 
outsourcer (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Petersen, Welch and Benito 2010). A Ukrainian 
employee at one of SimCorp’s contractees commented that: “All this together [bonuses, 
social events, trips to Copenhagen]… contradicted strongly with the thesis that being an 
outsourced part we were not a part of the company. This was not the case. We felt 
ourselves almost equal to SimCorp employees”.  
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The dynamic mechanisms shown in Figure 1 are indicative rather than exhaustive, 
especially in relationship terms. From a theoretical perspective, co-evolution theory 
appears to be an appropriate framework for setting mode change in the wake of offshore 
outsourcing, given its focus on process, and interacting factors in development (see e.g. 
Cantwell, Dunning and Lundan, 2010; Lewin and Volberda, 1999). Pajunen and Maunula 
(2008, 249) argue that ‘for a co-evolutionary relation to occur it is necessary that two or 
more processes must have a noticeable influence on each other’s evolution’. They apply 
co-evolution theory to internationalization in general, but the ideas are equally applicable 
to mode development dynamics. Lewin, Massini and Peeters (2009, 921) have used a co-
evolutionary framework, with managerial intentionality, in empirically examining the rise 
of offshoring in innovation projects. From their empirical data they found support for ‘the 
idea of cumulative experience building’ and an important role for managerial 
intentionality in explaining the development of offshoring.  
 
8. Conclusion  
 
The SimCorp case demonstrates that offshore outsourcing may involve much more than 
the outsourcing act. This ‘more’ can be quite substantial, depending on how much the 
outsourcer becomes involved in the foreign market and with its foreign partner. This is 
perhaps even more the case with services outsourcing, where there is often considerable 
focus on training and interaction of staff on both sides to ensure the quality of what is 
ultimately supplied – with cost implications. Whether it is a starting intention or not, 
involvement in the foreign market inexorably generates learning in various forms which 
may build a foundation for eventual mode development or change. Such mode-related 
learning goes beyond the outsourcing-focused organizational learning noted in other 
studies (Manning, Massini and Lewin, 2008). At the same time the inevitable concern 
about retention of key personnel at the outsourcing partners (representing significant, 
sunk investments in training and education), problems of contractual restrictions on the 
use of 3rd party development resources for client support,  aligned with the outsourcer’s 
internal learning processes, eventually became a driver for mode change, as in the 
SimCorp case, to ensure more effective control of the foreign operation.   
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Our study reveals how outsourcing can be used as a springboard to changed 
foreign operation mode activity in the host foreign market. Although the shift to captive 
outsourcing via subsidiary establishment entailed a substantial change in commitment, it 
could be argued that it was a sequential change: in various ways SimCorp had sought to 
internalize and control the activities of its contractees – including what might be called 
‘soft’ control measures, such as in the emphasis on implanting its ‘performance culture’. 
These actions prepared SimCorp in such a way that the subsidiary step was not viewed as 
a major one for the company.  
SimCorp’s Ukrainian experience exposed a number of change influences that 
emerged, and evolved, in an interactive way, driving its developing responses through the 
independent outsourcing stage. For example, feedback and learning from experience 
heightened control concerns. A high level of interaction and communication between the 
parties facilitated evolving trust, lowering perceived risk and uncertainty, supporting the 
transition to a subsidiary, and continued cooperation. As the company’s first step into 
outsourcing, it was perhaps inevitable that the type of learning would be a key factor in 
how it reacted and built the Ukrainian operation. Nevertheless, SimCorp began with a 
perspective that signalled and perhaps coloured the nature of its perception of, and 
responses to, the Ukrainian experience - as indicated by its insertion of a foreshadowed 
JV option even at the pilot project stage. Thus, the outcome showed strong evidence of 
both co-evolution and managerial intentionality (Lewin, Massini and Peeters, 2009).  
The SimCorp experience shows clearly that offshore outsourcing can play an 
important developmental role in a company’s penetration of foreign markets. It also 
demonstrates that offshore outsourcing should be considered alongside other foreign 
operation modes not merely as a way of lowering costs but potentially as part of a 
strategic pathway or bridge to extended and deepened internationalization. While cost 
advantages were not stressed as the key factor in the outsourcing move, they were a 
continuing underlying consideration for SimCorp: the shortage of software development 
talent in Denmark pushed up remuneration rates, and made Ukraine more attractive. 
Countering this effect, though, SimCorp experienced a range of costs associated with 
establishing and running its Ukrainian venture. Some of these costs were associated with 
ensuring control, such as the expatriation of its project manager to Kiev.   
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9. Managerial implications and research issues 
 
Offshore outsourcing is an important part of the international business operations picture 
that is here to stay, and likely to grow rather than diminish, so that it needs to be 
considered as an integral part of the internationalization strategies of companies. This 
means placing greater emphasis on both inward and outward sides of international 
activities and their connections. Wherever the drive for offshore outsourcing comes from, 
its future market development potential needs to be considered at the outset. If deeper 
future commitment is a possibility, a range of steps need to be taken – including the 
content of contractual arrangements, a more comprehensive assessment of potential 
contractees and market options, and possible links to the use of other modes as part of a 
more substantial mode packaging arrangement for the market in question. Our analysis 
has shown that companies can use offshore outsourcing in a proactive way in fostering 
internationalization. It might be feasible for the next step to be set up as an option in the 
initial contract with the foreign contractee, as SimCorp did, and many companies have 
done with joint ventures, licensing deals, and intermediary arrangements (Petersen, 
Welch and Welch, 2000). Importantly though, it requires a change in strategic thinking, 
to pursue its potential beyond cost reduction, particularly in the area of services. 
Internalization via equity or other forms of foreign involvement can be facilitated by 
contractual arrangements that include internalization options. To include mode switching 
options up front, though, requires a deliberate, planned approach to foreign operation 
development whereas emergent approaches tend to be more typical. In a study of 
contracting within the personal computer industry, it was found that contracts evolved 
over time as relationships between the parties developed and that they exhibited the 
impact of incremental, experiential learning. In particular, they observed that ‘rather than 
anticipating … problems and contingencies, the parties had to actually experience an 
adverse situation before addressing it in new contracts’ (Mayer and Argyres, 2004, 395).   
In this article we have focused on one company’s experience, with the limitations 
this approach entails, and it was its first foray into outsourcing, in a relatively unknown 
market area. There is obvious need for this account to be supplemented by others, 
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including those where companies have used outsourcing in different places in their 
patterns of internationalization. As well, there is a need for examples of companies that 
have gone on to other mode forms than wholly-owned subsidiary establishment, such as 
to JVs or a broader mixed mode approach (Benito, Petersen and Welch, 2009).    
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